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A CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY: SAFEGUARDING
CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
WITHIN THE ENIGMA THAT IS THE AMERICAN VICE
PRESIDENCY
Todd Garvey*
INTRODUCTION
The American vice presidency has undergone a dramatic transformation since
its inception at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. From the nation's most quali-
fied and influential citizens, to obscure and unimpressive unknowns, different periods
of our history have seen occupants of differing quality, skill, character, and reputation
grace the Office of the Vice President.' Throughout this evolution, two general themes
can be observed. First, with the exception of the first two occupants, the Vice President
has progressed from an ineffective, mostly symbolic representative, into a domestic
and foreign policy political power.2 Second, accompanying this increase in political
power and prestige has been an increase in the Vice President's role within the exec-
utive branch of government and a decrease in the office's daily legislative duties.'
The office's earliest occupants were less than pleased with the power and in-
fluence they wielded as the President's lieutenant. John Adams believed the vice
presidency to be "the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man con-
trived or his imagination conceived."4 Teddy Roosevelt declared, "I would a great
deal rather be anything, say professor of history, than Vice President. '5 John Nance
Garner, Vice President under Franklin Roosevelt, likened the office's importance to
"a pitcher of warm piss," lamenting that his acceptance of the office was the "worst
damn fool mistake I ever made."6 After Calvin Coolidge reluctantly accepted his
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009; B.A., Colgate University, 2005. To my
parents, for leading by example, and in memory of my late grandmother, Marjorie P. Perry.
For a thorough historical perspective of the American vice presidency, see JODY C.
BAUMGARTNER, THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY RECONSIDERED (2006).
2 See id. at 14, 123-26. Both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, due to their popularity
during the revolutionary period, remained influential politicians during their respective tenures
as Vice President. Id. at 12-13.
3 See Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?:
A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 849, 869 (2000).
4 Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 831 (2005).
' BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 3.
6 Id.; see also MICHAEL NELSON, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 21 (1988).
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party's nomination,7 he received a telegram from former Vice President Thomas
Marshall expressing his "sincere sympathy."8
Historically speaking, Vice Presidents had good reason to be discouraged. Ini-
tially, the office exercised only those few powers assigned and enumerated within the
Constitution.9 How then, did an office that inspired such discontent, become the cen-
ter of power and executive influence it is today? One would imagine that modem
Vice Presidents would not agree with the sentiments of many of their predecessors.
Indeed, no one today would doubt the power wielded by the current Vice President.'"
Somewhere along the evolutionary track of the American vice presidency, its con-
stitutional positioning was lost. The Founding Fathers considered the Vice President
much more a legislative officer than an executive official." Article I assigns the
Vice President its only originally enumerated power: the authority to preside over
the Senate with the ability to vote in the case of a tie. 12 Not a single executive power
was granted to the Vice President by the Constitution. Under Article II, the full exec-
utive power is vested in the President alone.
13
The modem Office of the Vice President began its shift towards the executive only
within the last sixty years, as modem Presidents incorporated their running mates into
their administrations through executive assignments, delegation of executive authority,
and statutory responsibilities. 4 There is a correlation between this movement towards
the executive branch and the growing prestige and power of the office." Through
these decades of change, time slowly blurred our conception of the Vice President,
to the point where the office itself would be unrecognizable to its creators. 6 This
so-called "constitutional hybrid" has, understandably, led to gross misconceptions
as to the role of the Vice President as a constitutional officer, confusion as to the limits
of the Vice President's powers and duties, and even confusion as to the office's branch
7 Coolidge is quoted as responding, "I suppose I'll have to take it." BAUMGARTNER, supra
note 1, at 3.
8Id.
9 Article I, Section 3 states that the Vice President shall preside over the Senate. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Early Vice Presidents, like Adams, presided over the Senate on a
daily basis. John Nance Gamer was the last Vice President to follow Adams's precedent. See
NELSON, supra note 6, at 33.
o See Albert, supra note 4, at 894.
" See Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra
note 3, at 868.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be President
of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.").
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
4 See Albert, supra note 4, at 831-37.
'5 See id. at 834-36.
16 See id. at 836-37 ("[T]he Vice Presidency has traveled light years since the found-
ing . ... ).
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membership.' 7 Confusion inevitably leads to disagreement and debate, especially
when interpretation of the Constitution lies at the center of the controversy. One of
many interpretive clashes concerning the identity of the Vice President came to a
head in the summer of 2007 over the classification and declassification of docu-
ments within the Office of the Vice President.'8
In June of 2007, the Office of the Vice President (OVP), as it has since 2003, re-
fused to comply with Executive Order 13,292 (the Order).' 9 The Order, among other
things, empowered the National Archives' Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) with the authority to oversee certain classification and declassification pro-
tocols,2' but in the summer of 2007 the OVP refused to report its classification infor-
mation and denied the ISOO the right to carry out an on-site inspection.2 ' It was clear
at the time that the OVP felt the Order did not cover the Vice President.22 What was
not clear, was why? Various statements surfaced from the OVP alleging a litany of
defenses for why the Vice President was exempt from the Executive Order: the Vice
President's unique role as a member of both the legislative and executive branches
exempted him;23 the order did not apply to the Vice President because he was not
an "entity within the executive branch";24 and the Vice President's constitutional
status was unclear 25 and an "interesting constitutional question" to be explored.26 The
OVP finally settled on a defense in a letter from Vice President Cheney's lawyer,
David Addington, stating that, as a textual matter, the Order distinguished the Vice
President and the President from executive agencies.27
17 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 7.
18 Adam Levine & Suzanne Malveaux, Congressman: Cheney Challenges Classified
Oversight, CNN.CoM, June 22, 2007, http:l/www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICSO6/22/cheney
.documents/index.html.
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 id.
22 id.
23 See Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (June 26, 2007) [hereinafter
June 26 Snow Briefing], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/
20070626-6.html.
24 Levine & Malveaux, supra note 18.
25 See Dana Perino, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter
June 25 Perino Briefing], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/
20070625-5.html.
26 Dana Perino, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (June 22, 2007) [hereinafter
June 22 Perino Briefing], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/
20070622-4.html.
27 Letter from David Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, to John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senator (June 26, 2007) [hereinafter Addington Letter], available at http://kerry.senate
.gov/newsroom/pdflAddingtonLetter.pdf.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The response to the OVP's initial claim that the Vice President was not an entity
within the executive branch was quick and critical, perhaps due to the administra-
tion's penchant for secrecy and the Vice President's recent, and directly contradictory,
claims of protection under the doctrine of executive privilege.28 The statement was
lampooned on many of the late night network comedy shows.2 Rep. Rahm Emanuel
(D-IL) even proposed an amendment on the House floor which would have restricted
funding to the Vice President's office."0
After receiving no clarification from the OVP as to their failure to comply, the
ISOO turned the matter over to the Attorney General, asking Alberto Gonzales to
make a determination regarding the obligation of the OVP under the Order.3 The
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, chaired by constitutional
watchdog Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), quickly became involved in the matter, question-
ing the legality of the OVP's claim.32 The public was incredulous.3 3 If they knew any-
thing of the structure of the United States government, it was that the Vice President
was clearly a member of the executive branch.
Part I of this Note considers the historical evolution of the Vice President's role
within America's constitutional structure. From the first Vice President through to the
current Vice President, the office has undergone substantial changes. 34 Part H1 con-
siders the statutory and constitutional arguments that can be made in an attempt to
assign the Vice President either to the executive or legislative branch. With compelling
arguments on both sides, the answer to this question is not absolute, and continues to
puzzle constitutional scholars to this day.35 The result is a practical, constitutional,
28 Vice President Cheney has repeatedly claimed the protections of executive privilege.
See, e.g., Associated Press, White House Contests Post on Providing Visitor Logs, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2006, at A8; Carol D. Leonnig & Jim VandeHei, Cheney Wins Court Ruling
on Energy Panel Records, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at Al.
29 Jon Stewart, anchor of The Daily Show, remarked, "Oh my God, the Vice President is
a crazy person .... It's like the Harlem Globetrotters saying they were part of Scooby and
the Gang, even though they only showed up once at a haunted amusement park and once on
some Christmas special... ." The Daily Show: Non-Executive Decision (Comedy Central
television broadcast June 25, 2007) [hereinafter The Daily Show], available at http://www
.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=89061 &title=non-executive-decision.
30 153 CONG. REc. H7365 (daily ed. June 28, 2007) (amendment offered by Rep. Emanuel).
3' Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to Alberto Gonzales,
U.S. Attorney Gen. (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Leonard Letter], available at http://www.fas
.org/sgp/isoo/isoo-ag.pdf.
32 See Letter from Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives, to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President (June 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Waxman Letter], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_cr/waxman
062107.pdf.
33 See, e.g., The Daily Show, supra note 29.
34 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 4, at 836-37.
31 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1; DONALD YOUNG, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE
HISTORY AND DILEMMA OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY (1965); Albert, supra note 4; Richard D.
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and historical analysis of the intended and resulting role of the Vice President-a role
that has evolved from a solely legislative officer, to a full-fledged, policy-influencing
member of the modem executive branch.36
Utilizing the findings from Parts I and II, Part Il analyzes the current constitu-
tional conflict on the premise that the modem Vice President is no longer a legislative
officer as was arguably intended, the office having evolved into a clear and influential
member of the executive branch. Vice President Cheney' s constitutional arguments,
though strong from a historical and textual perspective, hold little weight in light of
the contemporary role of the Vice President.37 This conclusion weakens Cheney' s pro-
posed interpretation of Executive Order 13,292 and plays a role in the illegality of
the office's failure to adhere to the protocols of the Order. 8
The Cheney conflict, pertaining directly to the constitutional position of the Vice
President, provides a contemporary opportunity to analyze the Vice President's current
constitutional role within the structure of the federal government. A full analysis
presents a somewhat surprising conclusion. The OVP's claim that the Vice President
is not a member of the executive branch is not completely absurd, and, in fact, finds
some authority. A historical, constitutional, and statutory analysis reveals an office
that existed as an ambiguous constitutional anomaly "located somewhere between the
legislative and the executive branches but not entirely welcome at either address. 39
Although strong evidence exists that throughout the first 150 or more years of the
American Republic, the vice presidency would have been considered, de jure, much
more a legislative officer than a member of the executive branch,' the Office's gravita-
tion towards the executive branch in connection with the Office's burgeoning political
power has created, defacto, a fully executive vice presidency.4'
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ROLE WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
From humble beginnings, the OVP has evolved into a position completely over-
shadowing its former self. When John Adams took his seat at the head of the Senate
in 1789, he could never have imagined the power and prestige of the office currently
held by Vice President Richard Cheney.42 More importantly for this discussion,
Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1988);
Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505
(1995).
36 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 14, 123-26.
31 See infra Parts I.E, IL.D.
38 See infra Part m.c.
39 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 508.
4o See id. at 515.
41 See id. at 549.
42 Adams characterized the office as "insignificant." See Albert, supra note 4.
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Adams likely would not have pictured the executive role of the modem Vice President,
or its role in creating and advancing public policy.43 The vice presidency, created at
the 1787 Constitutional Convention, has undergone three general phases of power and
influence-the traditional era, the transitional era, and the modem era." This move-
ment towards an executive identity, however, has not been a steady linear progression.
The evolution of the OVP has occurred through a process of punctuated equilibrium,
or distinct watershed periods of change followed by prolonged periods of stagnation.
45
The traditional era is marked by relatively weak Vice Presidents performing essen-
tially legislative duties. 46 Transitional-era Vice Presidents, spanning the first half of
the twentieth century, exhibit a movement towards greater power and more executive
responsibilities.47 The modem Vice Presidents, generally accepted as beginning with
Richard Nixon's second term as Vice President in 1956, complete the institutional-
ization of the OVP as an executive entity.48
A. The Convention
The creation of the American vice presidency at the Constitutional Convention is
often described as a mere "afterthought," or worse, an accident.49 The existence of
the Office itself was not proposed until September 4, 1787, more than three months
into the Convention.50 The final draft of the Constitution was approved just thirteen
days later.5 The Committee of Eleven, a group formed to consider miscellaneous
questions as the conclusion of the Convention approached, proposed the creation of
the OVP along with other provisions, most notably the Electoral College. 2
The Committee created the Vice President not as a permanent heir to a disabled
President, and certainly not as an active executive branch official, but as a "device to
facilitate the election of a national President."53 In fact, it is debatable whether the
43 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 123-26.
4' See id. at 14-34.
41 See id. at 23-33 (discussing significant changes during the transitional era of the vice
presidency).
4 See id. at 20-21.
41 See id. at 23-33.
48 See Albert, supra note 4, at 834.
41 Id. at 812 (calling the Founders' creation of the Vice President "an afterthought whose
eventual creation was virtually accidental" (citation omitted)).
50 See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 506-
12 (Gaillard Hunt & James B. Scott eds., 1987) [hereinafter CONSTrIUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES].
s' See id. at 580.
52 See id. at 506-07.
53 Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra note
3, at 867 (citation omitted).
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Vice President was intended to officially ascend to the presidency in the case of the
death or disability of the President rather than simply act as interim head, or steward
of the executive branch until a new election could be held. 4 It was not until John
Tyler assumed the presidency upon the death of President William Henry Harrison
in 1841 that the idea of vice presidential succession was established. 5
Strong regional and home-state allegiances were a major concern in creating an
electoral process that would result in a strong, effective, and unifying President. 6
The Founders predicted that votes for President would be cast by each state's electors
only for that state's "favorite son."57 Through the creation of the OVP, each state was
forced to vote for two candidates, presumptively the candidate from their state and the
most qualified candidate. 8 The presidency would be awarded to the candidate with
the most votes, and the vice presidency to the candidate finishing in second place. 9
The vice presidency existed, chiefly, as a means to compel state electors to support
a candidate hailing from outside of their own state.'
Though no delegate ardently supported the creation of the vice presidency, the
seemingly overlapping roles of the OVP did spark controversy during the Convention's
debate of the Office. 6' Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts, was most con-
cerned with the President's influence over the Vice President's control of the Senate
and the resulting impact on the doctrine of separation of powers, stating, "We might
as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. 6 2 George Mason, of
Virginia, argued against the proposal for its "mix[ing]" of legislative and executive
roles and its intrusion on the legislative powers of the Senate.63 Neither Gerry nor
Mason signed the final Constitution. 6 Connecticut's Roger Sherman summarized
the majority view, however, by reminding the delegates that if the Vice President was
not placed at the head of the Senate "he would be without employment," for he had
no enumerated role in the executive. 65 The envisioned lack of duties even led to pro-
posals to compensate the Vice President on aper diem basis, paying him only on those
days in which he actually "presided over the Senate. ' 66
54 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 11.
55 Id.
56 See Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra
note 3, at 866-67.
"' Id. at 867; see also Albert, supra note 4, at 816-19.
58 Albert, supra note 4, at 816.51 Id. at 817-18.
60 Id. at 817.
61 See Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 515.
62 CONSITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 50, at 527.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 638.
65 Id. at 527.
66 BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 9.
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Within three days, the Convention voted on the proposal, adopting the OVP and
the proposed method of electing a President by a vote of 8-2-1.67 As a member of the
majority position, Sherman's statements suggest that the Convention intended the OVP
to perform no duties outside presiding as President of the Senate, thereby restricting
the Vice President's substantive role to solely within the legislative branch.6s As long
as the President retained his health, there is no evidence from the Convention that the
Vice President would serve any role within the executive branch.69
B. Original Intent
The members of the Constitutional Convention clearly conceived of the vice
presidency as a legislative office. 70 However, the somewhat cursory process in which
the office was created,71 in combination with its constitutional inconsistencies and sub-
sequent malfunctions and reforms,72 begs one to question how much weight to give
to the Founders' intent when considering the constitutional role of the vice presidency.
First, as discussed previously, the creation of the Office occurred very late in the
convention and was debated only briefly.73 The OVP was proposed on September 4,
1787, and approved only three days later.74
Second, from a strictly textual standpoint, it is worrisome that the Vice President
may preside over his own impeachment.75 The text of the Constitution states, "The
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. '76 Because the Vice
President acts as the president of the Senate he has the pleasure of presiding over the
impeachment of federal officials.77 Recognizing a conflict of interest if the President
were impeached, the Framers added a clause to Article I, Section 6 appointing the
67 The delegates from Maryland and New Jersey voted against making the Vice President
head of the Senate. CONSTITIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 50, at 528.
68 Id. at 527.
69 See Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra
note 3, at 868.
70 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 515-16 ("Yet the
delegates clearly conceived the Vice President's primary duties as legislative .... Indeed, the
constitutional debates disclose no notion that the Vice President would assume any executive
functions while the Chief Executive retained his good health.").
71 See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 50, at 507, 527-28.
72 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 4; see also Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at
His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra note 3.
13 See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 50, at 507,527-28; see also
supra Part I.A.
74 See CONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 50, at 507, 527-28.
71 See Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra
note 3.
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
'n See id.
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to preside over a presidential impeachment." No
such exemption was created were the Vice President himself to be tried.
Third, the Founders' intended role raises the question of why the Vice President
should be given the authority to break voting ties within the Senate.79 The Vice
President does not participate in any committee debates or back-room negotiations.'m
He also does not participate in any floor debates surrounding proposed legislation.8"
The Vice President may not even be familiar with the nuances of the bill that produced
the tie.82 While the Framers wanted an impartial national official to break Senate ties
resulting from contentious issues, modem Vice Presidents merely break ties along par-
tisan lines with little or no involvement in the bill's procession through the legisla-
tive branch.83
Finally, and perhaps most glaring, is the failure of the Founders' initial execu-
tive election system as evidenced by the tumultuous election of 1800." Prior to the
Twelfth Amendment, the candidate with the second most electoral votes was awarded
the vice presidency.85 Although electors were forced to vote for two candidates,
they were not made to specify which vote was for President and which was for Vice
President.86 In the election of 1800, Jefferson tied with his declared running mate,
Aaron Burr, because of this procedural flawY Burr refused to concede and the election
was thrown to the House to name the third President of the United States.88 Jefferson
eventually won with the backing of Alexander Hamilton,89 but the event illuminated
a major flaw in the election system. By not forcing electors to distinguish between
votes for President and Vice President, the Framers had created an election system
susceptible to chaos and controversy. The flaw was quickly fixed in 1804 by the
Twelfth Amendment.' °
78 Id. ("When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside .....
'9 See YOUNG, supra note 35, at 318-19.
80 Id. at 319.
81 Id.
82 See id. (discussing the Vice President's controversial role as Senate vote tiebreaker).
83 See id. (discussing the Vice President's varying role in promoting and passing legislation).
'4 See Albert, supra note 4, at 838.
85 Id. at 817-18.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 838.
88 Id.
89 Though Hamilton's capitalist vision was diametrically opposed to Jefferson's agrarian
vision for the country, Hamilton labeled Burr "the most unfit man in the U.S. for the office of
President." JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 469 (2003).
90 The Twelfth Amendment charges electors to cast distinct ballots for President and Vice
President. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Each house of the same Congress that adopted the amend-
ment actually held a vote to abolish the vice presidency. BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 14.
The proposal failed 19-12 in the Senate and 85-27 in the House of Representatives. Id.
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The accepted thought at the Constitutional Convention seems to have been that
the Vice President was more a legislative official than a member of the executive
branch. 9' However, the last-minute nature of the addition of the vice presidency, the
inconsistencies relating to vice presidential impeachment and method of election, and
the Vice President's ability to break ties, all erode the immense weight that should
be given to original intent in most constitutional controversies. In creating the office,
the Convention was more worried about providing a vehicle to facilitate a successful
presidential election than in creating a Vice President of the United States. 92 Re-
gardless of the weight it should be afforded, it is clear that the original intent of the
Constitutional Convention was to create an officer of the legislative branch rather
than an influential, policy-driving member of the executive branch. 93
C. The Early Republican Era: Jefferson and Adams
The traditional era began with prominent and esteemed Vice Presidents that had
garnered their reputation for great public work prior to running for the Presidency.
94
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson laid the foundation for the traditional vice presi-
dency, though their personal prestige would never be equaled by subsequent occu-
pants of the Office.95 The period was marked by a "hands off' approach to executive
influence by a politically weak Vice President.
96
Both Adams and Jefferson limited themselves to the legislative duties given to the
Vice President under Article I, Section 3.97 Though Adams presided over the Senate
on a regular basis-and to this day holds the honor of casting the most tie breaking
votes by a Vice President 98-he lamented over how ineffectual and powerless he
was. "I am nothing," noted Adams, recognizing only his potential for power as Vice
President, "but I may be everything." 99 Adams, in accordance with his argumentative
and aggressive nature, would often participate in Senate floor debates, even taking
sides on individual policy proposals.' °
91 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 518.
92 Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra note
3, at 867.
" Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 518.
9' BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 12.
9 Id. at 14-15 (explaining that subsequent Vice Presidents, starting with George Clinton
in 1804, were regarded as "incompetents").
96 Id. at 14-21.
" Id. at 19 (describing the formal duties of the earliest Vice Presidents as "minimal," entail-
ing legislative duties such as presiding over Senate sessions).
91 Id. at 21.
99 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 519.
'" See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure
of Government,1789-1791, 2 U. Cmi. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 167 (1995).
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The Anti-Federalists in the Senate saw Adams's participation in Senate activities
as an unconstitutional abridgement of separation of powers."' Adams, on the other
hand, saw it as an opportunity for the Vice President to remain active within the fed-
eral government. " Anti-Federalists, retaining a strict adhesion to the principles of
separation of powers, saw the OVP as imperiling the independence of the legislative
branch.'0 3 In protest, the party refused to recognize Adams's executive position as
Vice President of the United States, identifying him only as the legislative president
of the Senate.'0 4
Jefferson expressly stated that the OVP was a strictly legislative officer, going so
far as to say that involvement within the executive branch would be unconstitutional.0 5
In referencing the clearly enumerated limits of the OVP, Jefferson wrote, "As to duty,
the Constitution will know me only as the member of a Legislative body; and its prin-
ciple is, that of a separation of Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary functions, except
in cases specified.., this principle.., is clearly the spirit of the Constitution.""
Though Adams and Jefferson each brought prestige to the OVP, the office took a
sharp turn towards obscurity after their departure. Following the Twelfth Amendment
and its change to the presidential election system, the Vice President was turned into
little more than the "social host" of the executive branch.0 7 Many traditional-era
Vice Presidents, realizing their futile situation, did not even reside in Washington.'0 s
The OVP devolved into a largely ceremonial institution, occupied by little-known
men, wielding little to no power, and performing very few, if any, executive duties.'"
The OVP remained powerless, with few occupants of note, for almost 125 years. °"0
D. The Conversion from Legislative to Executive
"[M]ediocrity to obscurity"' was the accepted progression for most traditional-
era Vice Presidents. It wasn't until Theodore Roosevelt that the first great shift in
I'0 Albert, supra note 4, at 824.
"o2 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 519 (stating that
although Adams believed the vice presidential position was "the most insignificant office that
ever the invention of man contrived," he was still more active in his Senate role than other
Vice Presidents).
103 Albert, supra note 4, at 824-25.
o" Id. at 824.
105 Nunn (Broad) vs. Jefferson (Narrow), WALL ST. J., May 5, 1988, at 32.
106 Id.
107 BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 22.
108 Id. at 21.
'09 Id. at 19-21.
"0 Id. at 23 (describing the first transitional-era Vice President as Theodore Roosevelt, who
came into office in 1901, almost 125 years from the time the first Vice President took office
in 1789).
"' Id.
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vice presidential power occurred." 2 This so called "transitional era" marked "a sharp
departure from the limited and humble origins" of the traditional American vice presi-
dency."'3 Under Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Vice Presidents John Nance
Garner and Harry Truman began to regularly participate in executive cabinet meet-
ings."4 While this meant a significant increase in the office's involvement in executive
policy making, the extent of that involvement was still limited. Truman, for example,
was not aware of the development of the atomic bomb until he ascended to the presi-
dency upon Roosevelt's untimely death." 5
The Eisenhower/Nixon administration is typically considered "the next great
leap" in the development of the OVP as an executive institution." 6 Lyndon Johnson
was the first Vice President to obtain the contemporary notion of proximity to the
President when he moved his offices from Capitol Hill and into the Executive Office
Building" 7 -an unambiguous sign of a repositioning from legislative to executive.
In 1969, in order to fund the increasing duties of the office, the OVP was provided
with a line item within the executive budget."' In 1974, Gerald Ford received his own
distinct staff-surprisingly something no Vice President before him ever had." 9 The
OVP was now funded by both the legislative and the executive branches. 2 Also,
as this Note will discuss, Truman gave the vice presidency explicit statutory execu-
tive authority by providing the OVP with a permanent seat on the National Security
Council.' Nixon himself estimated that, as Vice President, he spent ninety percent
of his time engaged in executive activities."'
While it was clear the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations had
transformed the functioning of the American vice presidency, the Office was not yet
perceived as a fully executive official. Truman explicitly wrote in his memoirs that
the Vice President "is not an officer of the executive branch."'23 Eisenhower as
well, was not yet convinced of a complete shift, writing that the Vice President was
"not legally a part of the Executive branch and [was] not subject to direction by the
President."'2 The last vestiges of the OVP's legislative role still remained.
112 Id. at 23-24.
"3 Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 35, at 505.
"" See Friedman, supra note 35, at 1723.
"5 Id. at 1710.
116 Albert, supra note 4, at 833. Eisenhower was credited with the "next great leap in the
growth of the Vice Presidency." Id.
"I Id. at 834.
118 Seeid.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000) (establishing the National Security Council and including the
President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and others as members of the Council).
122 YOUNG, supra note 35, at 318.
i Arthur Schlessinger, Jr., Is the Vice Presidency Necessary?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 1974, at 37, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issuesn74may/schlesinger.htm.
124 Id.
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E. The Contemporary Vice Presidency
It was not until Walter Mondale's tenure that our modem understanding of an
executive Vice President was solidified. Mondale fulfilled the transition started by
Gamer, Truman, and Nixon by completing the "institutionalization" of the vice presi-
dency.' 2 Mondale is credited for permanently changing the office "into an active par-
ticipant in executive government."'126 During his tenure, the Vice President's office
was moved to the west wing of the White House so Mondale could have continuous
and easy access to President Carter. 127 As Vice President, he regularly attended cabi-
net meetings,"' participated in weekly lunches with the President, and even obtained
his own vice presidential airplane. 129
Following Mondale's precedent, modem Vice Presidents have been increasingly
more involved in executive decision making, in domestic policy, in foreign policy, in
lobbying Congress, and in advocating for the President's policy agenda. 130 Today,
Vice President Cheney controls presidential briefings, has taken the lead on contro-
versial executive policies like the National Security Agency's wiretapping program
and the creation of military commissions, enjoys unprecedented access to President
Bush, manages judicial nominations, and maintains a strong influence on environ-
mental policy and tax policy.131 Vice President Cheney has exponentially increased the
Vice President's role as an executive advisor, often transcending his role as an advisor,
becoming a policy creator. 132
A practical and honest look at the modem Vice President reveals an overtly active
executive official only discretely connected to the legislative branch through the Vice
President's role of breaking a rare Senate tie. 133 In practice, the modem OVP is a
fully functioning executive institution, retaining little to none of its original ties to
125 See Albert, supra note 4, at 834.
126 Id.
127 Friedman, supra note 35, at 1723.
128 See id. (explaining that since President Roosevelt "reinstated the regular vice presidential
attendance at cabinet meetings," it became routine for later Vice Presidents to attend).
129 Albert, supra note 4, at 834.
130 See, e.g., id. at 813.
"' See Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: 'A Different
Understanding With the President,' WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Angler
Part 1].
132 See id.; Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: The Unseen
Path to Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Angler Part III; Barton
Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: A Strong Push from Backstage,
WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Angler Part III]; Barton Gellman & Jo Becker,
Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at Al
[hereinafter Angler Part IV].
133 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 115. By 2006, Vice President Cheney had broken
a Senate tie six times. Id. at 114.
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the legislative branch."3' Vice President Cheney has completed the constitutional
about-face from the legislative officer of 1787 to the executive official of 2007.
11. To WHICH BRANCH DOES THE VICE PRESIDENT BELONG?
Vice President Cheney' s claim that the OVP is not an entity within the executive
branch under the Order will resonate if, in fact, the Vice President is not an actual mem-
ber of the executive branch. A full analysis of the constitutional placement of the OVP
must consider historical, textual, statutory, and practical considerations. The historical
analysis, as discussed above, seems to support the existence of the OVP as a legislative
officer rather than an executive official.135 This conclusion can be attacked, however,
by arguments critical of the process and creation of the Founders' initial view of the
vice presidency. 3 6 The textual and statutory analysis will paint a somewhat ambigu-
ous portrait of the constitutional placement of the vice presidency, but a practical look
at the modem vice presidency manifests a clear executive placement for the OVP.
A. Separation of Powers
Why is it important that we determine to which branch of the federal government
the Vice President belongs? Why not just concede that the OVP is a constitutional
anomaly belonging partially to both the executive and legislative branches, or per-
haps, as the Vice President's press secretary claimed for a short period, to neither
branch-or a "fourth branch"?.37 Implicit in the notion of an ordered American con-
stitutional system is the Enlightenment political doctrine of separation of powers. 3 '
It is America's traditional acceptance of this doctrine that precludes the conclusion
that the Vice President may stand astride two branches of government.
The Founders "regarded [the theory of separation of powers] as an essential ele-
ment in the structuring of free government."'39 Their adherence to this doctrine, as
134 See Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?, supra
note 3 ("The Vice President has evolved into an officer of the Executive Branch. He rarely
presides over the Senate, except on ceremonial occasions or to break ties in favor of the
Administration.").
' See id. at 868 ("The framers conceived the Vice President as a legislative officer.");
see also supra Part I.
136 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 35, at 318 (arguing that according to the Constitution, it
is not essential that a Vice President preside over the Senate "at the exclusion of any assign-
ments that may come from the President," thus making executive matters a higher priority);
Albert, supra note 4, at 812 (arguing the position of Vice President was the Constitutional
Convention's "afterthought" and a "postscript").
' Peter Baker, White House Defends Cheney's Refusal of Oversight, WASH. POST, June 23,
2007, at A2.
138 See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A
Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 668, 668 (1990).
139 Id.
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evidenced in the Federalist Papers and other founding documents, makes it unlikely
and contradictory that the Framers of the Constitution would have created an exec-
utive office which maintained membership in the legislative branch, or vice versa. "
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective," wrote James Madison, "may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." 14' However, Montesquieu's theory does not demand an absolute and full
separation of all branches.' 42 As Madison understood the doctrine, members of one
branch could exercise certain levels of control over another branch. 143 Separation of
powers was violated only "where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department."' 44
Though our modem understanding of the doctrine gravitates towards a more com-
plete separation, Madison presciently left room for limited aspects of inter-branch
control. 145 The narrow interpretation of the separation of powers leaves no room for
the existence of a constitutional hybrid, while the broader view seems to predict and
accept the occurrence. No matter the accepted interpretation of separation of powers,
it remains imperative to determine the Vice President's positioning within our con-
stitutional system in order to solve arising constitutional questions involving branch
membership, like the conflict between Vice President Cheney and the ISOO.
B. Arguments for Executive Branch Membership
The average American, and rightfully so perhaps, would never think to question
the constitutional role of the Vice President as anything other than executive. The
Vice President runs with the President on the executive ticket, he occupies an office
in the White House, he participates in executive policy discussions, and he often
actively pushes the President's executive agenda.146
In only eight years as Vice President, "Cheney has shaped his times as no Vice
President has before."' 4 7 To say that Cheney has been "involved" in policy would be
an understatement. Cheney has been the driving force behind Supreme Court nomi-
nees, tax proposals, and energy policy, not to mention his leadership role in expanding
executive authority, the installment of his own plan for the treatment of detainees,
and his significant influence over President Bush in conducting the War on Terror. '
48
140 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1895).
141 Id. at 300.
142 See id. at 300-01.
143 See id. at 301-02.
144 Id. at 302.
14 See id. at 307.
'" See, e.g., Angler Part I, supra note 131; sources cited supra note 132.
147 Angler Part I, supra note 131.
148 See, e.g., id.; sources cited supra note 132.
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Cheney also reportedly directs and controls briefings to the President, and commands
the budget process. 49 The Vice President clearly has one hand on the Bush adminis-
tration helm, steering President Bush by framing policy options, confident that his
advice will be viewed as the "final words of counsel."' 50 While as a practical matter,
it would seem clear that the Vice President must be a member of the executive branch,
there are various statutory and constitutional arguments to be made that may clarify
the Vice President's position as an executive entity.
From a constitutional standpoint, "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.""'5' Implicit in the executive power is the
authority to delegate executive duties to executive officials and executive agencies.1
5 1
Given that the "vesting clause" places the entirety of executive power with the Presi-
dent, with no "residuum" left for other entities, whatever executive power the Vice
President retains is by virtue of delegation to the OVP by the President.153 However,
it would raise serious separation of powers concerns for an official of one branch to
delegate his essential authority to a member of a competing branch. Delegation of ex-
ecutive power to a Vice President who claimed to be a member of the legislative branch
would necessarily face greater scrutiny from courts as an invalid exercise of the fun-
damental powers of the executive branch by a member of the legislative branch.
154
As a permanent member of the National Security Council, the Vice President has
specific statutorily assigned executive duties.' 55 President Truman gave the OVP a
specifically assigned executive duty through the National Security Act of 1947, which
designed a council qualified to "advise the President with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to that national security." 156 Fel-
low members of the National Security Council, including the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense, are all planted firmly in the executive branch. 157 The Vice
President's membership on the National Security Council places him in a small group
'" See Angler Part I, supra note 131; Angler Part III, supra note 132.
15' Angler Part I, supra note 131.
151 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
152 PUB. L. No. 82-248, 65 Stat. 713 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1951)).
'53 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1539,
1541 (2008).
1' "In general, the delegation of executive power to legislative officials violates the consti-
tutional separation of powers." Id. at 1542. The non-delegation doctrine acts as a safeguard
against voluntary intermingling of the branches, and an enforcer of separation of powers.
Though the Court has not expressly struck down a statute as a violation of the non-delegation
doctrine since 1935, the Court has recently hinted at the doctrine in expressing its rejection of
the Line Item Veto Act and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act. See, e.g.,
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
151 See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000).
156 Id.
157 Id.; see, e.g., The Extent of Independent Presidential Authority to Conduct Foreign
Intelligence Activities, 72 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1859 n.32 (1984).
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of high-level executive officers with special advisory influence over the President.' 58
This is strong evidence of executive branch membership.
The OVP obtains funding and staff in order to assist the Vice President in carry-
ing out his assigned executive duties.'59 This funding and staff is provided to the
Vice President to "enable [him] to provide assistance to the President in connection
with the performance of functions specially assigned to the Vice President by the
President in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities."'' This funding
comes directly out of the executive budget and is classified under United State Code
Title 3, Chapter 2: "Office and Compensation of President.' 6' The statute not only
authorizes funding for the Vice President in carrying out his executive duties, but
also recognizes the President's daily working relationship with the Vice President.'
62
The statute directly references the Vice President as fulfilling "executive duties and
responsibilities."'' 63 A Vice President that performs executive duties and is funded
through a line item on the executive branch budget must be considered an entity within
the executive.
From a practical standpoint the Vice President looks like an executive official,
talks like an executive official, and acts like an executive official. Vice President
Cheney has an extremely close and congenial relationship with the President.' 6 He
participates, if not runs, executive cabinet meetings during which he wields great
power.' 65 Cheney himself has claimed to be an executive official through his invo-
cation of the doctrine of executive privilege. '6 Any reasonable observer of the daily
functions of the White House would have to concede that the Vice President seems
to be an active and influential entity of the executive branch.
C. Arguments for Legislative Branch Membership
Evidence supporting a legislative Vice President is not confined to historical
visions and original intent. Historically, the Vice President was considered a legis-
lative official. Not surprisingly then, lost remnants of that idea remain within the
Constitution and the United States Code. 67 These arguments provide some founda-
tion for Cheney' s original assertion that the OVP is not an "entity within the Execu-
tive branch."'
' 68
158 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000).
159 3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (authorizing the Vice President to hire a staff).
16 Id. (emphasis added).
161 3 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2006).
162 See 3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
163 Id. (emphasis added).
'" See Angler Part I, supra note 131 (reporting that the Vice President and President
convene for weekly lunch meetings).
165 See id.; Angler Part III, supra note 132.
"6 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 169-74.
'6' Levine & Malveaux, supra note 18.
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Much like the arguments for executive membership, evidence of legislative
membership can also be found in the source of the Vice President's funding. The
Vice President continues to draw his salary from the legislative branch under 5
U.S.C. § 2106, which provides for the organization of government and payment of
government employees and officials. 69 When classifying government employees
for payment purposes, § 2106 states, "For the purpose of this title, 'Member of
Congress' means the Vice President, [and] a member of the Senate or the House of
Representatives . "...170 Therefore, as far as his salary is concerned, the Vice
President is an employee of the legislative branch.
From a purely constitutional perspective it is hard to argue that the Vice President
is not a member of the legislative branch. The Vesting Clause of Article 2, Section 1
of the Constitution empowers the President, and the President alone, with executive
power. 17' The absolute language of this clause leaves free no residuum of power for
other entities. 172 Had the Framers intended the Vice President to exercise some modi-
cum of constitutionally authorized executive power they very easily could have in-
cluded the Vice President in their distribution of executive power.'7 3 Instead, the text
of Article II furnishes the Vice President with no executive powers. 74
Though the Vice President lacks constitutional executive power, the document
does assign specific legislative powers to the Vice President.'75 Indeed, the only spe-
cifically enumerated power assigned to the Vice President was the Office's role as
president of the Senate. 176 Article I, Section 3 reads, "The Vice President of the
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be
equally divided."' 77 This clause places the Vice President at the head of the Senate
and, in the case of a tie, empowers him to cast a deciding vote. 7 8 The Vice President,
as the leader of a legislative body and a quasi-voting member of the Senate could,
therefore, be regarded as a member of the legislative branch. It would be logically
inconsistent not to consider an individual with the authority to vote in a legislative
body a "member" of that body. A Vice President could easily cast more votes in the
Senate than, say, a medically incapacitated member, such as Senator Tim Johnson
169 5 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
170 Id.
'.' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.").
172 Reynolds, supra note 153, at 112. Or, in the apt words of Justice Scalia, "this does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power." Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
177 id.
178 Id.
[Vol. 17:565
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY
from South Dakota, who spent nearly a year away from the Senate after a life threaten-
ing brain hemorrhage in December of 2006.'9 Confined to a strictly textual analysis,
the Constitution clearly perceives the Vice President as a legislative officer.
The Incompatibility Clause raises another interesting constitutional argument
supporting legislative branch membership. Separation of powers is an accepted aspect
of American constitutional law, and would presumptively prevent one individual
from holding political positions in two branches of government. The drafters of the
Constitution embedded one aspect of the doctrine within the Constitution through the
Incompatibility Clause.' 80 Article I, Section 6 reads, "[N]o Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office."' 18' How then, could the Vice President retain an office in the executive branch
along with his role as a quasi-voting member of the Senate?
The applicability of this Clause to the constitutional positioning of the Vice
President must be considered within the context of history. The members of the
Constitutional Convention authored both the language that created the Vice Presidency
and the Incompatibility Clause. Either the Framers created an office that violated their
fundamental values and the Constitution, or the Vice President is either an executive
office holder or a member of Congress.'82 It would be unreasonable to think that the
Framers created "a walking violation of the separation of powers doctrine" within
their own founding document. 183 The Vice President cannot hold an office within
the executive branch while simultaneously being a member of Congress. Consider-
ing the indicia of the historical vice presidency and original intent, if these two roles
are in fact mutually exclusive, greater evidence favors a "center of gravity" in the
legislative branch."4
Strong arguments can be made against the applicability of the OVP to the
Incompatibility Clause. The main contention is that the Vice President is by no
means a "member" of the Senate. 18 Under Article I, Section 3, and subsequently the
Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate is wholly composed of two representatives from
each state.186 Were the Vice President considered a member of the Senate, whichever
state he hailed from would possess three representatives in the Senate. Certainly
however, one could perceive Article I, Section 3 and Section 6 as independent grants
179 Bart Jansen, Senate Welcomes Back S.D. Democrat Tim Johnson, CQTODAY, Sept. 5,
2007.
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
181 Id.
182 Friedman, supra note 35, at 1722.
183 Id.
14 Id.
"85 Id. at 1721. Furthermore, "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote." U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
186 Friedman, supra note 35, at 1721.
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of membership. It is quite reasonable to think that the president of a body, empowered
with the responsibility of breaking tie votes on highly contentious issues, would be
a "member" of that legislative body.
One could argue that if the OVP is considered an executive office, it is so only
by virtue of the goodwill of the President, and not by any constitutional mandate.'
8 7
Other than modem statutory assignments like membership in the National Security
Council, the Vice President's executive duties exist only by virtue of the President's
delegation of authority, an authority inherent within the executive power and codi-
fied in 3 U.S.C. § 301. 18 Therefore, the Vice President's executive power lies only
in his continuing relationship with the President, or to put it pessimistically, the Vice
President's power relies on the whims and emotions of the President."8 9 If the
President chooses to no longer delegate executive authority to the Vice President,
chooses to remove him from cabinet meetings, or chooses to remove him from all
executive policy assignments and return the office to the days of Jefferson, he may
do so. The argument can be made that executive membership exists only as a function
of the Vice President's continued benevolent relationship with the President and not
by any constitutional or statutory authority."9 Once that relationship sours and exec-
utive delegations of power are removed, the Vice President would cease to be an
executive entity.
To clarify this point, consider this hypothetical. 9' Information is leaked by an
anonymous staffer in which the staffer overheard Vice President Cheney, in a private
conversation, voice his opposition to the President's immigration and naturalization
policies. The Washington Post subsequently runs a story releasing Cheney's oppo-
sition to the President's policies. The statement completely alienates Cheney from
President Bush and causes Bush to lose trust in his Vice President. Bush, through
an executive order, chooses to remove all executive authority he has delegated to Vice
President Cheney. Cheney will no longer participate in cabinet meetings, he will no
longer hold any advisory role within the White House, and will no longer be privy to
any confidential political or military information. President Bush even evicts Cheney
17 See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 112.
.88 The statute recognizes the President's inherent authority to delegate "any function
which is vested in the President by law" but limits the individuals to which the President can
delegate power to "the head of any department or agency in the executive branch" or any
official appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2008).
189 "I've just reminded Hubert," remarked Lyndon Johnson, in reference to his ability to
manipulate Hubert Humphrey's executive power, "that I've got his balls in my pocket."
Friedman, supra note 35, at 1709.
'90 See Reynolds, supra note 153, at 112.
The forthcoming scenario may not be as far fetched as it may seem at first glance. There
have been a number of Presidents whose relationships with their Vice Presidents disintegrated
during their terms. Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Spiro Agnew were all locked out
of their respective administrations at one point. See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 128-29.
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from his west wing office, moving him back to the Capitol. Cheney no longer has
access to the President, nor does he perform any other executive duties. Now that the
practical argument for the Vice President as an executive member is removed from
the equation, we are left with a Vice President whose daily duties parallel those of
Adams and Jefferson, in that his duties are solely legislative in nature. 9 ' Considering
the original intent of the Founders and the historical legislative foundations of the
Vice President, how could this hypothetical Vice President be considered a member
of the executive branch?
By this reasoning it becomes entirely possible that our traditional view of a
purely executive Vice President lies, at the very least, on shaky ground. In fact, the
Vice President's executive authority rests entirely at the pleasure of the President. 93
Our perception of the OVP would be greatly changed if a President chose to remove
his executive authority from the Vice President.
The basis for an executive Vice President is not constitutional or historical, nor
was it intended by our Founders. Executive membership is purely based on the prac-
tical application, and limited statutory grants, of modem duties of the Vice President
as delegated by the President. If, and only if, that authority were removed, the only
argument that seems to classify the Vice President as executive, the argument of prac-
tical application, disappears. We are left only with the original intent of the Framers
and the historical nature of the Vice President, both of which point to a legislative
assignment.
D. Branch Membership Conclusion
As late as the 1950s, the Vice President could honestly claim to be much more a
legislative officer than an executive official. 94 To make such a statement today re-
quires willful ignorance and a false characterization of the duties and powers of the
modem Vice President. The current Vice President is an active participant in exec-
utive policy making and advising, maintains an influential role within the National
Security Council, holds a strong relationship with the President, is privy to classified
executive documents and exercises executive classification authority, wields great
political influence over the executive branch, and rarely, if ever, exercises his con-
stitutional authority to preside over the Senate. 95 Though it may run counter to our
history, prudence dictates that the modem Vice President, with his conspicuous exec-
utive identity and his utterly absolute isolation from Congress, must be considered
a member of the executive branch.
'9 See supra Part I.C.
' See Reynolds, supra note 153.
'9 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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III. VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY'S CONFRONTATION WITH THE ISOO
With the preceding analysis placing the modem Vice President as a member of the
executive branch, an honest consideration of Cheney's conflict with the ISOO and the
reach of Executive Order 13,292 becomes possible. The Vice President put forth two
main arguments to buttress the claim that his Office was not covered by the Order.
The first, and broader argument, was that the classified information protocols within
the Order did not apply to the OVP because the Vice President is not an "entity within
the executive branch" as defined by the Order. 96 This was the argument that fell flat
in the face of public incredulity and that has been disproved in Parts I and II. The
OVP quickly shifted, but did not abandon, nor ever denounce, the "not an entity" argu-
ment, for a second and more finely tuned argument: Cheney was not beholden to the
protocols of the Order for reasons related to exemptions created within it.
197
A. Executive Order 13,292 as Applied to the Office of the Vice President
President Clinton instituted Executive Order 12,958 in April of 1995 in an
attempt to create a "uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying
national security information."' 98 Specifically, Executive Order 12,958 laid out
procedures to be followed throughout the executive branch with regard to the
classification and declassification of information at the various levels of confidenti-
ality, as well as the implementation and review of the instituted protocols. 199
Oversight of the classification and declassification process was granted to the newly
created ISOO. 20 0 In pursuit of enforcing Executive Order 12,958, the ISOO was
granted authority to carry out investigations and inspections, including the authority
to conduct on-site inspections of offices bound by Order 12,958.2°1 Clinton's Order
was soon implemented through 32 C.F.R. § 2001, which empowered the ISOO to
collect yearly statistics on classification and declassification of materials from any
agency "that creates or handles classified information. ' '202
Executive entities, including the OVP, have been reporting the number of pages
they have classified and declassified each year to the ISOO since Clinton's 1995
Executive Order 12,958.203 Based on statistics gathered by the ISOO during President
Bush's first term, information classified by executive agencies had almost doubled
196 Mark Silva, Cheney Keeps Classification Activity Secret, CI. TRIB., May 27, 2006,
at 4.
'9' See Addington Letter, supra note 27.
'9' Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2000).
'99 Id.
200 Id. (Section 5.3, 3 C.F.R. 351, created the ISOO).
201 id.
202 32 C.F.R. § 2001.80 (2007).
203 See, e.g., Silva, supra note 196.
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between 2001 and 2004 from 8.65 million classification decisions to 15.65 million
respectively.2 4 As of 2007, executive agency classifications had risen to a staggering
23.1 million.2 5 A reasonable increase makes sense when one considers the burgeon-
ing national security infrastructure of a post-9/1 1 world, including the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, combined with the Bush administration's penchant
for secrecy.2°6 Yet questions have been raised claiming this "overclassification" of
national security material obstructs not only governmental transparency, but also
hampers, among other things, the smooth exchange of intelligence between national
security agencies.2 7
In March of 2003, President Bush amended Executive Order 12,958, incorpo-
rating his own views on classified national security information through Executive
Order 13,292.28 Bush's amendment retained much of the language and purpose of
Executive Order 12,958, with a few subtle, yet far reaching alterations.2 Many of
these alterations revolved around Richard Cheney and the OVP, creating a vast ex-
pansion of vice presidential powers in the realm of classification and declassification
of national security information.210
Three significant grants of authority to the OVP in Bush's Order, which received
very little coverage from the press at the time, arose from § 1.3(a) on original clas-
sification authority, § 1.3(c) on the delegation of classification authority, and § 3.5(b)
which exempted the OVP from mandatory declassification review. 21' Through Order
13,292, the Vice President was given original authority to classify information.1 2
Whereas the President could have delegated classification authority to the Vice
President prior to 2003, the amended Order now empowered the Vice President with
the ability to classify information without the approval of the President.2 3
Beyond granting this original classification authority, the amended Order also
granted the Vice President the power to delegate classification authority.214 Section
204 Id.
205 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHTOFFICE, REPORTTOTHEPRESIDENT 1 (2007), available athttp:fI
www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2007-annual-report.pdf.
206 Silva, supra note 196.
207 See RICHARD POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED Focus, HALTING STEPS
92-97 (2007).
208 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004).
209 See Byron York, The Little-Noticed Order That Gave Dick Cheney New Power, NAT'L
REV. ONLINE, Feb. 16,2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york2006O2l6O841.asp.
210 See id.
21 The first two sections were finally the subject of a detailed article published in the
National Review in February 2006. Id.
212 Exec. Order No. 13,292,3 C.F.R. 197. Prior to 2003, only the President and those agency
heads designated by the President had the power to classify information. See Exec. Order No.
12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 336 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2000).
213 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 197.
214 id.
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1.3(c) of the Order states that Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential classification
authority "may be delegated only by the President; [and] in the performance of exec-
utive duties, the Vice President. '21 5 This clause enables the Vice President to delegate
classification authority to "subordinate officials" with a "demonstrable and continuing
need to exercise this authority.
'216
The final alteration found in the Order exempts the OVP from intra-agency
21mandatory declassification review. 17 Section 3.5 mandates that "all information clas-
sified under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassi-
fication by the originating agency," except information originated by the President,
Vice President in the performance of his executive duties, their staffs, appointed presi-
dential committees or boards, and other entities within the executive that "solely
advise and assist the incumbent President. 2t 8 Section 3.5 clearly creates an exemp-
tion for the Vice President in regard to the mandatory intra-agency declassification
review.2 9 Although it is uncertain how this section applies to the ISOO, this is the
clause the OVP argues exempts the OVP from ISOO review.220
The end result of the Order is an "enormously consequential expansion of vice-
presidential power."" Vice President Cheney has been given original and delegatory
classification authority, a clearly executive power which augments the argument that
the modem Vice President is an executive entity. The Order also exempts the OVP
from the prescribed mandatory intra-agency declassification review.222 The extent of
this exemption lies at the center of the OVP's conflict with the ISOO. May the Vice
President exercise his newly authorized classification authority free of outside over-
sight and review, or does the Order subject the OVP to outside review of classification
procedures by the ISOO like any other executive entity covered by the Order?
B. The Battle Over Review of OVP Classification Procedures
In May of 2006, Mark Silva of the Chicago Tribune published an article relating
2005 statistics released by the National Archives, on the classification and declassifi-
cation of national security information.223 Silva reported that the OVP again, as it had
since 2003, refused to report classification statistics, purportedly in violation of Bush's
2003 Order which applies to any entity within the executive branch. 22 When asked by
215 Id
216 Id.
217 Id. at 205-06.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 York, supra note 209.
22 Id.
22 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 205-06.
22 Silva, supra note 196.
V Id.
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Silva why the OVP refused to report the required classification information, Cheney
spokeswoman Lea Anne McBride made a novel argument: the Vice President was
not an agency under the Order.225 "This has been thoroughly reviewed and it's been
determined that the reporting requirement does not apply to [the Office of the Vice
President]," said McBride, "which has both legislative and executive functions."226
True, the Vice President does have legislative and executive functions, but is this
enough to exempt the OVP from the broadly worded Order? Was the Vice President
claiming that he was not a member of the executive branch?
The opening shot was fired by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American
Scientists shortly after the publication of Silva' s article.' Writing to William Leonard,
then-Director of the ISOO, Aftergood voiced his concern over what he saw as willful
non-compliance with a standing Executive Order.22 Aftergood reminded Leonard
that the ISOO's directives are binding on any executive agency.229 Section 6.1 of the
Order defines "agency" as any "entity within the executive branch that comes into
the possession of classified information."' Aftergood denounced the OVP' s claim to
be exempt from the order as an argument that could not "be proposed by a reasonable
person in good faith," and recommended the ISOO compel the OVP to comply with
the Order, or "[a]sk the Attorney General to render an opinion on the applicability"
of the reporting requirements to the OVP.23'
Leonard responded with a letter to Cheney chief lawyer and confidante, David
Addington.232 Leonard mentioned Aftergood's letter as well as his duty under § 5.2
of the Order to "consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from per-
sons within or outside the Government., 233 Alarmed, Leonard understood the Vice
President's argument to mean that the OVP did not believe itself to be an "entity
within the executive branch. 234 Leonard went on to warn Addington of the conse-
quences of this position. 23 5 Leonard argued, were Cheney not an "entity" within the
executive, "this could possibly impede access to classified information by OVP staff,
since such access would be considered a disclosure outside the executive branch. 236
225 Id.
226 id.
227 Letter from Steven Aftergood, Dir. of the Project on Gov't Secrecy, Fed'n of Am.
Scientists, to J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office (May 30,2006) [hereinafter
Aftergood Letter], available at http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/05/isoo-ovp.pdf.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 214 (2004).
23' Aftergood Letter, supra note 227.
232 Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to David Addington,
Chief of Staff to the Vice President (June 8, 2006) (on file with author).
233 Id.
234 id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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Leonard concluded that, as a majority of classified disclosures from other executive
agencies to OVP staff are made under the assumption that the disclosures are being
made intra-branch, it is "entirely appropriate" that classification activity of the OVP
be reported to the ISOO under the Order.237
With no movement from the OVP, Leonard apprised the Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales of the situation and asked him to "render an interpretation as to whether the
Office of the Vice President of the United States (OVP) is an agency as defined in
§ 6.1 (b) of the Order and thus responsible to fulfill the responsibilities of an agency
as set forth in the Order." 238 In his January 9, 2007, letter, Leonard based his argument
for the inclusion of the OVP in the Order on a plain text reading of the Order and the
subsequent policy implications resulting from an exemption for the OVP. 239 Leonard
clearly and concisely argued that, though there was an explicit exemption for the Vice
President himself in regard to the mandatory declassification review, the Order did
not exempt the OVP from on-site review by the ISOO, writing: "This sole explicit
reference for the purpose of exempting the OVP from a provision of the Order sup-
ports an interpretation that the rest of the Order does apply, to include the Order's
definition of an 'agency;' otherwise there would be no need for an exemption." 2' An
exemption for the Vice President under a specific section did not translate into an
exemption for the Vice President throughout the Order.
Leonard also explained to the Attorney General, as he had to David Addington,
the policy implications relating to the disclosure of classified material if the OVP was
not an executive branch entity.24' Leonard closed: "I believe that OVP staff, when
they are supporting the Vice President in the performance of executive duties, are an
entity within the executive branch that comes into possession of classified information
and are thus, for purposes of the Order, an agency., 242
Five months later, after no reply from either Vice President Cheney or Attorney
General Gonzales, Aftergood filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel.243 His letter, dated May 31, 2007,
asked for copies of all documents generated in response to Leonard's request for an
interpretation of the OVP's responsibilities under the Order.2" On June 4, 2007,
Aftergood received a disappointing, but perhaps expected, reply from the Department
of Justice. 24' The Office of Legal Counsel had found "no documents within the scope
237 id.
238 Leonard Letter, supra note 31.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 id.
243 Letter from Steven Aftergood, Fed'n of Am. Scientists, to Elizabeth Farris, Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 31, 2007) (on file with author).
244 Id.
245 Letter from Bradley Smith, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Steven
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of [Aftergood's] request." 246 Evidently, no investigation, no research, no review,
and no interpretation had been made pursuant to Leonard's request for clarification
of the Order.247
The story gained public legs on June 21, 2007, once Henry Waxman (D-CA),
chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, released
a lengthy letter he had written to Vice President Cheney.248 Waxman called the Vice
President's decision to exempt himself from the Order "problematic" because it
"place[d] national security secrets at risk."'249 Waxman added that considering the
OVP's repeated inability to protect classified information or avoid dangerous security
breaches, he "question[ed] both the legality and the wisdom of [the Vice President's]
actions." 250 Waxman emphasized the importance of on-site inspections by the ISOO,
a power granted to the ISOO by the Order, as essential to ensuring agency compliance
and protection of classified information.25' The letter highlighted the OVP's obstruc-
tion of these on-site inspections as well as Addington' s disturbing retaliatory attempt
to abolish the ISOO, via amendment to the Order, following Leonard's request for the
OVP to report on their classification protocols and to allow an on-site inspection.252
Waxman also questioned Cheney' s misuse of the "declassification process for
political reasons. 253 Waxman cited the selective leaking surrounding the prosecution
of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, as well as the prosecution of a former aide for supplying
plotting-revolutionaries in the Philippines with classified information.2 Waxman
stressed his legitimate concerns over the OVP, of all executive offices, exempting itself
from an executive order intended to protect and secure the classified information. 5
"Your office may have the worst record in the executive branch for safeguarding clas-
sified information," wrote Waxman, "[g]iven this record, serious questions can be
Aftergood, Fed'n of Am. Scientists (June 4, 2007) [hereinafter Smith Letter] (on file with
author).
246 id.
247 Compare Leonard Letter, supra note 31 (showing Leonard's request to Gonzales), with
Smith Letter, supra note 245 (stating that the Office of Legal Counsel had no documents con-
-ceming Leonard's request).
248 Waxman Letter, supra note 32.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. In a recent interview, ISOO director Leonard also voiced concern over the Vice
President's use of the classification process for political motives, questioning Cheney's prac-
tice of marking internal political communications as "Treat as Sensitive Compartmentalized
Information" and stressing the potential for this misuse of the classification process to con-
fuse analysts and endanger actual confidential national security information. Michael Isikoff,
Challenging Cheney, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/id/81883.
254 Waxman Letter, supra note 32.
255 id.
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raised about both the legality and the advisability of exempting your office from the
rules that apply to all other executive branch officials. ' ' 256 The media latched on to
the Waxman letter and the story broke in all the major media outlets. 27
The day after the Waxman letter was released, the press began asking questions
at the daily White House press briefing. 58 Press Secretary Dana Perino had the un-
enviable job of fielding the plethora of questions that came from the White House
Press Corps regarding the OVP's alleged exemption.259 In the face of the unconvinced
and curious journalists, Perino seemed to float the earlier argument that, due to the
Vice President's legislative duties, he was not an "entity within the executive branch,"
while still relying on the argument that the language of the Order treats the Vice
President differently from other agencies. 60 When asked whether the Vice President
was a member of the executive or legislative branch, Perino dangled provocative
phrases such as: "that's an interesting constitutional discussion about the separation
of powers"; the Vice President maintains a "unique role"; and "this is an interesting
constitutional question that the legal scholars can debate. 26' Perino backed up the
branch membership defense with the statutory interpretation defense, saying the Order
was "just simply a matter of a small portion of an executive order regarding report-
ing requirements, of which [the Vice President] is not subject to" and it was "clear
from the reading of [the Order], the Vice President is not treated separately from the
President. 2 62 What was clear, was that the OVP had yet to articulate a clear reason
why the Vice President was exempt from the Order.
On the 25th of June, Senator Dick Durbin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee
on Financial Services and General Government, sent Vice President Cheney a letter
expressing his concern over the "legality and the appropriateness" of the OVP' s ex-
emption from the Order. 63 Durbin, however, summarizing the public's understand-
ing and rejection of the branch membership defense, may have mischaracterized the
constitutional status of the Vice President in writing that Cheney was
grossly distorting the intent of the framers. Just because the
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate are in the line of presidential succession does not make
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., June 22 Perino Briefing, supra note 26 (demonstrating that the White House
Press Corps spent an entire briefing focused on the Waxman letter).
258 See, e.g., id.; June 25 Perino Briefing, supra note 25.
259 See, e.g., June 22 Perino Briefing, supra note 26.
26 See, e.g., id. It is entirely possible that Addington sent Perino into the briefing room
simply to gauge the press's response to the former argument.
261 June 22 Perino Briefing, supra note 26.
262 Id.
263 Letter from Richard Durbin, U.S. Senator, Chairman of Senate Subcomm. on Fin.
Services & Gen. Gov't, to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President (June 25, 2007) (on file with
author).
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them part of the executive branch. Nor is the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court an officer of the legislative branch simply because
the Constitution specifies that he preside over the Senate during
an impeachment trial.26
Officials within the line of succession have no ongoing affirmative grant of executive
power, unlike the Vice President, who may constitutionally exercise legislative power
whenever a tie arises in the Senate. The Chief Justice only presides over the impeach-
ment of a President, and in such scenarios acts more as an outside mediator than a
voting member of the Senate.265 Durbin had a legitimate and reasonable concern in
Cheney's self-exemption from the Order, but his reasoning reflected the common
misunderstanding of the vice presidency in the context of history.
Finally, on June 26, 2007, more than one year after the initial request, the OVP
responded to the ISOO's appeal for compliance with the Order.2 6 Cheney's lawyer,
David Addington, rather than respond directly to the ISOO, replied to an earlier letter
from Senator John Kerry regarding the Vice President's position.267 In the OVP's first
official response to the ISOO's inquiry, Addington chose to focus solely on the alleged
exemption language of the Order.26 8 "Executive Order 12958 as amended in 2003,"
wrote Addington, "makes clear that the Vice President is treated like the President and
distinguishes the two of them from 'agencies. '-269 But what of the OVP's initial argu-
ment, that due to the hybrid nature of the Vice President he was exempt from the
Order? Addington added:
Given that the executive order treats the Vice President like the
President rather than like an 'agency,' it is not necessary in these
circumstances to address the subject of any alternative reasoning,
based on the law and history of the legislative functions of the
vice presidency and the more modern executive functions of the
vice presidency.27 °
The official stance of the OVP seemed to be that because the textual language of the
Order exempted the Vice President from its obligation to the ISOO, the alternative
constitutional argument, though not necessarily incorrect, need not be invoked. Even
if the OVP was settling on the textual argument, it by no means abandoned the broader
and more provocative constitutional argument. Later that day, Tony Snow supported
264 id.
265 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
266 Addington Letter, supra note 27.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
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Addington' s textual argument while downplaying the constitutional argument in the
daily White House press briefing.
2 71
Although Chairman Waxman sent further communications to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for updates on the status of their review of the application of the Order
to the OVP, no decision was ever released by the DOJ.2 72 The executive branch set-
tled on the textual argument for the exemption, downplayed, but did not abandon, the
constitutional argument, and the story all but blew over.273 The last cinders of the
argument were reignited on Christmas Eve of 2007.274 The previous September, ISOO
Director Leonard had retired after thirty-four years of public service.275 Leonard gave
no reason for the unexpected retirement, but it was assumed that his exit was, at least
in part, due to the conflict with Cheney and Addington.276 Leonard took the high road
in his resignation letter, writing only, "the integrity of the security classification sys-
tem is essential to our nation's continued well-being; yet it will not be maintained
,,277
on its own.
On Christmas Eve, however, Newsweek released an interview with Leonard in
which he voiced his discontent with Cheney's classification methods.278 He admitted
that his conflict with Cheney' s office was a "contributing" factor in his resignation. 279
He also confirmed that there had been an email from Addington to the National
Security Council Task Force recommending that the ISOO be abolished via amend-
ment to the Order. 280 As the ISOO director, Leonard was disappointed at Addington's
response to a legitimate national security concern."8 Leonard went further to denounce
the traditional balancing test for the declassification of national security information-
a black and white test weighing national security against the public's right to know.282
He recommended a needed shift towards the recognition of the national security
dangers related to keeping information secret.283 "[D]isclosing information may cause
271 June 26 Snow Briefing, supra note 23.
272 Letter from H. Marshall Jarrett, Office of Prof 1 Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Steven Aftergood, Dir. Of the Project on Gov't Secrecy, Fed'n of Am. Scientists (Feb. 14,
2008) (on file with author). In February of 2008, the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility
found no professional misconduct in the Office of Legal Counsel's failure to issue an inter-
pretation of the Order. Id.
273 June 26 Snow Briefing, supra note 23 (emphasizing the textual argument when re-
sponding to questions).
274 Isikoff, supra note 253.
275 Press Release, U.S. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Director of the National Archives
Information Security Oversight Office Retires (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author).
276 Isikoff, supra note 253.
277 Id.
278 id.
279 id.
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
[Vol. 17:565
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY
damage," Leonard stated, "but you know what, withholding that information may even
cause greater damage. 284
C. Final Analysis: Does the Order Apply to the OVP?
With the historical context of the functions and duties of the Vice President, as
well as the arguments made for both sides in response to the OVP's conflict with ISOO
over reporting requirements behind us, the question of whether the OVP is covered
by the Order can be fully considered. Cheney and Addington, with support from the
White House, argue the Order "makes clear that the Vice President is treated like the
President and distinguishes the two of them from 'agencies. "285 Three inquiries must
be made in order to answer the government's final argument for exemption from the
Order. First, is the OVP treated equivalently to the President under the Order, there-
fore maintaining separate obligations from an agency? Second, does the OVP meet
the requirements for classification as an agency under the Order? Third, is the OVP
an entity within the executive branch? Answering these three preliminary questions
regarding the status of the Vice President will provide the reasoning behind the appli-
cability of the Order to the OVP.
1. Is There an Express Exemption for the OVP Under the Order?
The Vice President argues that the President's intent under the Order was to treat
the OVP no differently from the President.' This was certainly the intent of the Order
in certain sections and in regard to certain classification procedures.287 Because of the
cursory nature of the answer Addington provided in response to the ISOO inquiry, as
well its high level of generality, it is unclear as to what section of the Order the OVP
is basing its claim.288 It is reasonable to suspect that the OVP's arguments stem from
§ 3.5 and § 6.1 of the Order.289
Section 3.5 outlines procedures for a mandatory declassification review by each
agency that participates in the classification process.2' The opening clause of the
284 Id.
285 Addington Letter, supra note 27.
286 Id.
287 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 196-97, 205-06 (2004).
288 Id.; see also June 22 Perino Briefing, supra note 26 ("[I]f you look on page 18 of the
EO... there's a distinction regarding the Vice President versus what is an agency.").
289 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 205-07, 214.
290 Section 3.5 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all information classified
under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassi-
fication by the originating agency if:
[1-3 omitted]....
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section states that "all information classified under this order.., shall be subject to
a review for declassification by the originating agency., 29' Clause (b), however,
creates an exemption to this required review when the information is originated by
the President and his staff, the Vice President and his staff, or other executive
entities whose sole function is to "advise and assist" the President.292 Is this the
section the OVP is relying on as the basis for their exemption? If so, that reliance
seems to be misplaced.
Section 3.5 certainly deals with classification oversight and review. This clause
however, clearly pertains to inter-agency mandatory review. The language mandates
a review "by the originating agency" not by an outside office like the ISOO.293 The
"originating agency" would be the agency that initially classified the information.
Section 3.5, therefore, exempts the OVP from conducting its own mandatory declassi-
fication review. It does not however, exempt the originator from the outside review
of the ISOO, which is authorized under a different section of the Order.
Section 5.2 establishes the ISOO and authorizes the National Archivist to appoint
the ISOO Director.294 The section also delineates the powers and authority of the
ISOO in conducting oversight of the Order's classification protocols.295 Among those
powers listed are the authority to develop and implement the Order, oversee compli-
ance, review and approve agency methods for declassification, conduct on-site reviews
of each agency's programs, and "to require of each agency those reports, information,
and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. ' '296 This
clause is a significant grant of power and a considerable amount of responsibility for
a single office in policing and overseeing the entire classification and declassification
(b) Information originated by: (1) The incumbent President or, in the perfor-
mance of executive duties, the incumbent Vice President; ... is exempted from
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section.
Id. at 205-06.
291 Id.
292 id.
293 Id. (emphasis added).
294 Section 5.2, in part, reads:
(b) Under the direction of the Archivist, acting in consultation with the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of
the [ISOO] shall: (1) develop directives for the implementation of this
order; (2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this order
and its implementing directives; (3) review and approve agency imple-
menting regulations and agency guides for systematic declassification
review prior to their issuance by the agency; (4) have the authority to
conduct on-site reviews of each agency's program established under
this order, and to require of each agency those reports, information, and
other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities.
Id. at 210-11.
295 id.
296 Id.
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process. All directives issued by the director in an effort to implement the Order are
"binding upon the agencies." 297 The section also grants the ISOO power to "consider
and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the
Government., 298 This is the clause Director Leonard acted on when he responded to
the Federation of American Scientists' letter criticizing the OVP's failure to comply
with the Order.29
Conspicuously absent from all of § 5 is any reference to exemptions for the OVP.
Specific references are made for separate treatment of the OVP in §§ 1, 3, and 4, but
no mention of differential treatment is made in § 5.300 An honest reading of the Order
presents no exemption for the OVP from the review authority granted to the ISOO.
Leonard emphasized this point in his letter to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
in his request for an interpretation of the Order's applicability to the OVP: 'This sole
explicit reference for the purpose of exempting the OVP from a provision of the Order
supports an interpretation that the rest of the Order does apply, to include the Order's
definition of an 'agency;' otherwise there would be no need for an exemption., 30 1 For
example, the President and the Vice President are treated on equal terms throughout
the Presidential Records Act (PRA), but, unlike the Order, the PRA contains express
language to that effect.30 2 The existence of explicit exemptions of the OVP from the
more general agencies in individual sections of the Order lead to an interpretation that
the OVP, if it meets the definition of an agency, is included in those sections where
no explicit exemption exists. This leads directly to question number two.
2. Does the OVP Meet the Requirements for Classification as an Agency Under
the Order?
Section 6.1 provides definitions for pertinent terms found throughout the Order.30 3
Section 6. 1(b) states: "'Agency' means any 'Executive agency,' as defined in 5 U.S.C.
[§] 105; any 'Military department' as defined in 5 U.S.C. [§] 102; and any other entity
within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified informa-
tion. ' 3 4 The clause creates a broad coverage umbrella for the Order. But what ex-
actly is an "Executive agency"? The Order cites to 5 U.S.C. § 105 which states that
an "'Executive agency' means an Executive department, a Government corporation,
and an independent establishment. 303 Not much help. Fortunately, one of the few
297 Id. at 210.
298 Id. at 210-11.
299 Leonard Letter, supra note 31.
0 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004).
301 Leonard Letter, supra note 31.
31 Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2007).
303 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 214-18.
314 Id. at 214.
305 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
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issues surrounding this controversy to have been previously considered, both eval-
uated within the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel and litigated before
the Supreme Court, is what exactly constitutes an "agency.' 6 Ironically, much of
this litigation stemmed from another statute which pertained to prying information
from the clutches of the executive branch.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) guarantees the public a legal right of
access to certain government documents. 3' FOIA mandates disclosure of certain
"agency" documents upon written request, and defines an "agency" as "any executive
department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled
corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (includ-
ing the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency."308
This is language very similar to that used to define "agency" in the Order and can shed
light on interpreting the breadth of that term.
In February of 1994, then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger authored
an opinion for the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel regarding the status of the OVP
as an agency for the purposes of FOIA. 3' Dellinger concluded that the OVP was
not an "agency" under FOIA and, therefore, was not restricted by its terms.310
Dellinger centered his analysis on the so-called "sole function test" as articulated by
the Supreme Court, and the absence of express language conveying an intent that the
Vice President be subject to the Act.31 These are two arguments the OVP could
employ in defense of its exemption.
In Soucie v. David, appellants challenged the Office of Science and Technology's
(OST) refusal to disclose a requested report relating to the development of supersonic
aircraft.312 One of the questions presented by the case was whether the OST, created
to evaluate federal scientific research programs and to advise the President on issues
of science and technology, was an agency under the Act.31 3 "If the OST's sole
function were to advise and assist the President," wrote Chief Judge Bazelon for the
D.C. Court of Appeals, "that might be taken as an indication that the OST is part of
the President's staff and not a separate agency., 314 FOIA conferred "agency status
31 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156
(1980); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Memorandum fromWalter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney Gen., to Todd J. Campbell, Counsel & Dir. of Admin. Office of the Vice
President (Feb. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/foiavp.htm. For a discussion of these examples, see infra text accompanying notes 309-32.
3' Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
308 Id. § 552(f).
31 See Dellinger Memo, supra note 306.
310 id.
311 id.
31 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
313 Id. at 1071-72.
314 Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).
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on any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of
specific functions. 31 5 However, because the OST retained the power to evaluate fed-
eral science and technology programs, it had functions beyond simply advising the
President. 316 The Court held that "[b]y virtue of its independent function" the OST
was an Agency subject to the requirements of the Act.317
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted the sole function test in Kissinger
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.1 8 Kissinger was an action brought
by a group of journalists against then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to force
disclosure of certain documents under FOIA. 3 9 The journalists sought records kept
by Kissinger's secretary regarding phone conversations in which Kissinger partici-
pated during his time as assistant to the President.320 The Supreme Court relied on leg-
islative history in reasoning that those "'whose sole function is to advise and assist
the President' are not included within the term 'agency' under the FOIA., 321 It Was
clear to the Court that, when acting in his capacity as an assistant to the President,
Kissinger's sole function was to provide advice and support to the President.322 There-
fore, the phone records did not qualify as "agency" records under the Act.323 In impor-
tant dicta, the Court did imply, however, that records from National Security Council
meetings in which Kissinger participated may have qualified as agency records.324
Kissinger, Soucie, and the Dellinger memo. help to elucidate the issue of whether
the OVP constitutes an "agency" for the purposes of the Order. A reasonable appli-
cation of the sole function test to the OVP must come to the conclusion that the OVP
is an agency. In Soucie, the OST was found to be an agency because of its role in
evaluating federal science programs.3 5 In Kissinger, an assistant to the President was
found not to be an agency, for his only role was to advise the President.326
Does the OVP serve the sole function of advising and assisting the President?
Dellinger argued in his 1994 memo that "[t]he OVP clearly satisfies the Supreme
Court's 'sole function' test, because the Vice President and his staff do not have
315 Id. at 1073.
316 Id. at 1075.
317 id.
318 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
319 Id. at 136-37.
320 Id. Kissinger acted as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from
1969-1975 and Secretary of State from 1973-1977. Id. at 136.
321 Id. at 156.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 157. The Court cited a House Report which indicated that the National Security
Council was an executive agency subject to FOIA. Id. at 156. The Court then declined to
"decide when records.., merely 'relate to' the affairs of an FOIA agency become records
of that agency." Id.
31 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
326 Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 136-38.
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'substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions,' ... but rather
have the sole function of advising and assisting the President."3 27 Dellinger' s argu-
ment seems to misinterpret the independent powers of the Vice President. As dis-
cussed previously, the Vice President is a distinct entity with various powers and roles
in the federal government.3" Most blatantly, he acts as the President of the Senate, with
the authority to vote in the case of a tie. Dellinger argues that the Vice President's
legislative role need not be considered because FOIA does not apply to Congress.329
True, FOIA did not apply to congressional records, but the language of Soucie and
Kissinger do not support the view that the sole function test refers only to executive
functions. Neither the test in FOIA nor the Order requires that an agency have sub-
stantial independent authority in the exercise of specific executive functions.330
The Vice President, in another independent function, also holds a permanent
seat on the National Security Council.33' Although the Council exists to advise the
President in national security decisions, the important dicta in Kissinger seems to
state that the Council itself qualifies as a separate agency.332 For good measure, the
Vice President also serves as a permanent and official member of the Board of Regents
for the Smithsonian Institution.333 Assuredly, the modem Vice President acts as a major
advisor to the President,3" but it can not be said that the advisory function is its sole
governmental function.
In concluding that the OVP was not an agency under FOIA, Dellinger cited the
textual language from the Presidential Records Act to show that vice presidential rec-
ords receive the same treatment as presidential records.335 The PRA expressly states
"Vice-Presidential records shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same
manner as Presidential records." '336 This clear language is conspicuously absent from
the Order. The OVP and White House's response to repeated questions investigating
the reasoning behind the Vice President's claimed exemption has been to tirelessly
reiterate that the President intended that the Vice President be treated equally to the
President and separately from agencies.337 If this was indeed the intent of the Order,
327 Dellinger Memo, supra note 306 (citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1067).
328 See supra Part I.
329 Dellinger Memo, supra note 306.
330 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004).
a33 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000).
332 Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
333 BAUMGARTNER, supra note 1, at 117.
31 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 54,58 (1977) ("It is true that the Congress which enacted the
Hatch Act did not consider the role of the Vice President's staff, for the Vice President had no
role in the executive branch at the time. Circumstances have changed, and modem Presidents
use the Vice President as both political spokesman and policy adviser.").
3" Dellinger Memo, supra note 306.
31 Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2000).
311 See, e.g., supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
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then why did the President not say so? Why not include the same simple language
that was included in the PRA?
There are arguments to be made that favor the exemption of the OVP from classi-
fication as an agency, many of which have been accepted by federal courts. Contrary
to this author's reasoning, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
has specifically held, albeit without thorough explanation, that the OVP does not con-
stitute an "agency" under FOIA.338 Specifically, in 2000, the court held that offices
within the executive branch "whose functions are limited to advising and assisting the
President" do not qualify as agencies.339 In one conclusory and unexplained sentence
the court reasoned, "This includes the Office of the President (and by analogy the
Office of the Vice President)."' In 2004, the same court referenced the "sole function
test" and noted that "[c]learly the Vice President and the Office of the Vice President
function in that capacity."" Then again in 2006, the D.C. court cited the Schwarz
case in holding that the OVP was not an agency under FOIA.342 In all these cases, no
reference was made to the previously discussed independent powers exercised by the
Vice President.
Perhaps the OVP's strongest argument in favor of the exemption comes from a
canon of statutory interpretation used by the courts. "When faced with a problem of
statutory construction," reasoned Chief Judge Bazelon, "this Court shows great def-
erence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. ' ' 3 The Order is an executive order authored by and administered by
the President. That being the case, courts would likely give great deference to the
President's interpretation of his own executive order. Considering the President sup-
ports the Vice President's interpretation of the order, it is likely a court, especially the
D.C. Circuit Court, would be willing to find an overall exemption for the OVP.
Using the useful parallel of litigation surrounding the definition of an "agency"
under FOLA, it is evident that precedent supports the OVP's status as a non-agency
under that statute.' This certainly strengthens the OVP's claimed exemption under
the Order, but it is not dispositive in coming to a final conclusion. Key differences
exist in the language used to define agency in FOIA and the Order.-4
338 Schwarz v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2000).
339 Id. at 147.
340 Id. (emphasis added).
"' Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 310 F.2d 271, 298 n.8 (D.D.C. 2004).
342 Wash. Post v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 459 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70 (D.D.C. 2006).
3 Soucie v. David, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 n.29 (D.D.C. 1971) (quoting Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
34 See supra text accompanying notes 309-26.
" Compare Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(1), with Exec. Order No. 13,292,
3 C.F.R. 196, 214 (2004).
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3. Is the OVP an Entity Within the Executive Branch?
Even if the OVP is not considered an agency under the language of FOIA, it
should be considered an agency under the more broad language of the Order. While
FOIA includes any "other establishment in the executive branch '' 346 in the definition
of agency, the Order more broadly includes "any other entity within the executive
branch that comes into the possession of classified information. 347 An executive
"establishment" lends itself to the requirement of independence from the President
as the courts interpreted it under FOIA. "Entity" however is a much broader term.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "being, existence." 8 It would seem im-
possible to choose a term with wider application in the executive branch. Any office
that merely exists within the executive branch and comes into possession of classified
information is covered by the definition of agency under the Order. 49
Most likely recognizing the broad implications of the language used to define
an agency, the OVP was forced to make an argument for exemption based on the
Office's alleged constitutional positioning outside of the executive branch. Parts I
and II have shown that in relation to the modem Vice President this is an untenable
position. The contemporary Vice President, and Richard Cheney specifically, exist
within the executive branch. Therefore, even if the OVP is not an agency under
FOIA, it is an "entity within the executive branch" under the Order.35° Since the
Office has clearly come into possession of classified information it should be bound
by the Order, which includes participation in reporting to the ISOO and cooperation
with ISOO on-site inspections. 35' The Vice President's refusal to submit to over-
sight by the ISOO is a violation of the Order.
D. Consequences of Non-Compliance with the Order
The consequences of an executive office that refuses to participate in classification
security protocols, believing instead that national security is best served through strict
concealment of sensitive information and executive consolidation, could be severe.
In today's world, sensitive national security information must be securely protected,
interpreted efficiently and accurately, and applied in an effective and valuable manner.
The OVP's conduct raises concerns in all three of these areas.
Even with the Vice President's penchant for secrecy, sensitive information has not
been securely protected within the OVP.352 The Office has a reputation for classified
346 Freedom of Information Act § 552(f).
3" Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 214.
348 OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
349 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 214.
350 id.
351 Isikoff, supra note 253.
352 See Waxman Letter, supra note 32 (asserting that Vice President Cheney's Office "may
have the worst record in the executive branch for safeguarding classified information").
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intelligence failures, most notably the very public outing of covert CIA Agent Valerie
Plame.353 By refusing to cooperate with an ISOO review of the Office's classification
procedures, the OVP is barring the very entity that was created to help identify and
correct these types of classified information failures.
Secondly, the OVP's failure to comply with the Order hampers the efficient and
accurate analysis and interpretation of classified information by resulting in a system
of excessive classification. 354 A record 15.65 million classification decisions were
reported by executive agencies in 2004 .3' The esteemed Judge Richard Posner has
identified the many consequences to national security that result from overclassi-
fication.3 1 6 Overclassification makes officials careless with classified information,
hampers their ability to remember what is classified and what is not, restrains dissent
through lack of knowledge, enables agencies to bury their mistakes, and most im-
portantly inhibits information sharing among intelligence branches and officers.357
"[O]verclassification feeds the delusions of omniscience," writes Posner, "that come
naturally to senior officials of the world's greatest power. "358 Instead of making its
way through the intelligence chain to various analysts and specialists, the sensitive
information is halted in the OVP and seen by only a handful of individuals with ade-
quate security clearance. 35 9 The role of the ISOO, through on-site inspections and
classification process review is to combat this overclassification. 3' By refusing to
release information regarding their classification procedures the OVP is not protect-
ing national security, it is threatening it.
Whereas overclassification as a result of a good faith belief in the advancement
of national security through the concealment of sensitive intelligence information is
understandable, the overclassification of non-essential intelligence for political reasons
is utterly unacceptable. In reference to Pentagon Papers,36' the seminal government
secrecy case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold commented, "It quickly becomes appar-
ent to any person who has considerable experience with classified material that there
is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not
313 See, e.g., Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Bush Administration is Focus of Inquiry; CIA
Agent's Identity was Leaked to Media, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al.
311 See, e.g., INFO SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORTTOTHEPRESIDENT7 (2003), available
at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2003-annual-report.pdf ('Too much classification
unnecessarily impedes effective information sharing.").
... Silva, supra note 196. In response to a slight decrease in classification decisions in 2006,
Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists remarked, "The numbers are down
from record-high levels to second record-high levels .... It's hard to get excited about that,
but it's better than increases." Id.
356 See POSNER, supra note 207, at 90-93.
317 Id. at 93.
358 Id.
319 Id. at 89-90.
31 See, e.g., INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 354, at 3.
36' N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort or
another. 362 Vice President Cheney has the habit of using classification procedures to
protect politically sensitive information rather than sensitive security information.363
In his Newsweek interview, former ISOO Director Leonard criticized Cheney' s practice
of protecting sensitive political information within his office by marking the documents
with "handle as SCI [Sensitive Compartmentalized Information]."3 6 Cheney used this
method to conceal information relating to a proposed media response to accusations
made by Plame's husband.365 These kinds of uses of the classification system foster
disrespect for the system and undermine the seriousness of classifying information.
Again underlying the importance of ISOO review of OVP conduct, these abuses of
the classification system were meant to be combated by ISOO access and review.36
The Vice President's cavalier attitude towards the classification process and re-
lentless pursuit of executive concealment is one of many examples of the Bush admin-
istration's use of secrecy in carrying out controversial policy. The administration has
been marked by a number of abuses of secrecy in the execution of its NSA domestic
electronic surveillance and extraordinary rendition programs, as well as its repeated
invocation of executive privilege and the state secrets privilege.367 The conflict with
the ISOO is just one battle in the war between open government and transparency on
one hand, and the consolidation of executive power and secrecy on the other.
CONCLUSION
The American vice presidency has undergone significant changes in power,
structure, and prestige-maturing exponentially over the last 250 years as it slowly
gravitated towards the exercise of executive power.368 The Office has grown in influ-
ence as it becomes more and more an executive official and less and less a legislative
officer. Under Dick Cheney, the Vice President's executive duties have known no
bounds. Vice President Cheney creates policy, acts as an advisor to the President, and
participates in daily briefings, discussion, and executive decisions.369 He has sired a
new era of vice presidential power and influence, rivaling anything the American vice
presidency has seen throughout its existence.37°
362 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 63 (2004).
363 Isikoff, supra note 253.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 See, e.g., INFO. SEC. OvERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 354, at 6-7 (discussing the intentions
behind Executive Order 12,958).
367 See, e.g., Angler Part I, supra note 131; Angler Part II, supra note 132.
36' Albert, supra note 4, at 813.
319 See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
370 See supra Parts I.C-E.
[Vol. 17:565
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY
President Bush's Executive Order 13,292 was authored with the purpose of pro-
tecting the most sensitive national security information found within the executive
branch.37' The Order applies to all agencies within the executive, and "any other en-
tity within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified informa-
tion. 372 Although it can be argued that the Vice President does not constitute an
agency under the Order, it can not be asserted with honesty that the modem OVP is
not an "entity within the executive branch that comes into possession of classified
information." 373 The modem Vice President maintains an executive identity, is not
specifically exempted from ISOO review, and is therefore bound by the protective
protocols as laid out in the Order. It is apparent that the Vice President has attempted
to exploit the historically legislative nature of the OVP in an effort to consolidate
executive power by excluding outside review of the Office's classification policies.
By refusing to report classification statistics, and by obstructing the ISOO's ability
to conduct a review of the OVP's classification procedures, the OVP has violated, and
is currently in violation of, the Order.
With Vice President Cheney' s tenure in office coming to a close, and little evidence
of future investigatory action by the DOJ, it is clear that there will be no resolution
to this controversy before inauguration day. However, this does not make independent
oversight of the classification process a moot issue. Indeed, it will be for the next
President to determine whether national security is best served through a continua-
tion of the new era of extreme secrecy and executive consolidation, ushered in by the
Bush and Cheney administration, or by favoring openness, transparency, and the free
flow of national security information amongst the intelligence community. That same
President must also confront the rise of the vice presidency as an executive institu-
tion. Will the next President be willing to delegate substantial amounts of authority
to a Cheney-style executive Vice President? Or will we see a roll back in the OVP' s
executive duties and influence over the President as part of a backlash against the pre-
cedent set by the most powerful, and perhaps most controversial, Vice President in
American history? The fate of the Office, whether to progress in power or embark on
a return to impotence, will be surrendered to the man who on January 20, 2009, placing
his right hand on the Bible, swears to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States.
"'3 See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004).
372 Id. at 214.
373 id.
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